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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
Charles R. Gibbs*
Andrew E. Jillson **
Marvin R. Mohney***
N 1983 the Texas Legislature gave little substantive attention to the
area of creditor and consumer rights. During the 1983 survey period
the greatest amount of judicial activity in this area involved the appli-
cability and scope of the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA).'
I. THE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Texas courts decided a number of cases during the survey period involv-
ing the definition of a consumer entitled to the protection afforded by the
DTPA, the appropriate measure of damages in a DTPA action, the notice
requirements of and defenses available to actions under the DTPA, and
the requirement that the act complained of be the producing cause of the
injury to be actionable under the DTPA.
A. Defintion of Consumer
The DTPA defines a consumer as "an individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, this state, or a subdivision of this state who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services .... ,,2 Texas courts decided a
number of cases during the survey period involving a determination of
whether the plaintiff was a consumer entitled to the rights and protections
of the DTPA.
In English v. Fischer3 a dispute arose between the mortgagors and the
mortgagee over the proceeds of a fire insurance policy. The mortgagors
purchased a home from the mortgagee and signed a promissory note, se-
cured by a deed of trust on the home that required the mortgagors to
* B.A., Duke University; M.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at
Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas, Texas
** B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; J.D., College of William
and Mary; Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., Kalamazoo College; M.A., University of Chicago; M.B.A., University of Chi-
cago; J.D., College of William and Mary; Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas.
I. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
2. Id. § 17.45(4).
3. 649 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 660
S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
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purchase a fire insurance policy naming the mortgagee as beneficiary. Af-
ter the house was damaged by fire, the insurer issued a check payable to
both parties. The mortgagee, however, refused to endorse the check to the
mortgagors to allow them to rebuild their home with the insurance pro-
ceeds. The insurance company tendered the proceeds of the policy into the
registry of the court and the mortgagors filed an action for damages
against the mortgagee alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
violation of the DTPA.4
The jury found that the mortgagee represented to the mortgagors that
the deed of trust, promissory note, and/or the insurance policy conferred
or involved rights or obligations that the mortgagee did not have or that
were prohibited by law, and that such representation was a producing
cause of the damage to the mortgagors.5 The jury credited the damages
awarded, however, with the unpaid balance due by the mortgagors on the
note. On appeal, the Corpus Christi court of appeals stated that for one to
be a consumer, two requirements must be met:
One requirement is that the person must have sought or acquired
goods or services by purchase or lease. . . . Another requirement
.. . is that the goods or services purchased or leased must form the
basis of the complaint. . . . If either requirement is lacking, the per-
son aggrieved by a deceptive act or practice must look to the common
law or some other statutory provision for redress.6
The court ruled that the mortgagors did not satisfy either of these two
requirements. The house was purchased in 1967 and the mortgagors com-
plained of an alleged misrepresentation made by the mortgagee in 1979.
Noting that no complaints relating to the sale of the house in 1967 were
made, the court ruled that the complaint therefore did not involve goods or
services, and that the goods or services purchased did not form the basis of
the mortgagors' complaint. 7
In Sam Bradley Realty Co. v. McNair8 a real estate broker and one of its
agents sought recovery of a real estate commission from the sellers of a
parcel of property. The sellers filed a cross action for actual and exem-
plary damages under the DTPA.9 The district court entered a take-noth-
ing judgment in favor of plaintiffs, but awarded actual and exemplary
damages to the defendants on their cross action. The plaintiff-broker and
agent appealed. In reversing in part the trial court's decision, the court of
appeals determined that the vendors were required to prove that they were
4. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1984) prohibits a rep-
resentation that a product confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not
have or involve or that are prohibited by law.
5. 649 S.W.2d at 85.
6. Id at 92 (quoting Cameron v. Terrell Garmett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex.
1981)).
7. 649 S.W.2d at 92.
8. 644 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
9. The basis of the vendor's claim under the DTPA was that the broker's action in
filing a lis pendens notice, thereby encumbering the vendor's property, constituted an uncon-
scionable action or course of action entitling it to relief under the Act. See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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consumers in order to recover on their cross action.' 0 In the absence of
evidence that the alleged loss suffered by the vendors was either related to
or the result of the brokerage services that the broker provided, the ven-
dors failed to establish an essential element of their action. " The court
determined that the evidence conclusively showed that the alleged objec-
tionable conduct of the realtor occurred after the realtor had ceased to
perform services for the vendors. The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's favorable judgment on the vendors' DTPA claim because nothing
in the record indicated any cause and effect relationship between the oc-
currence of the actionable conduct and the purchase by the vendors of the
realtor's services.1 2
The question of whether an insured under an automobile insurance pol-
icy was a consumer under the DTPA was considered in Rosell v. Farmers
Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. 13 In Rosell an automobile driven by
an individual insured by the defendants struck the plaintiffs' daughter.
The plaintiffs commenced the action against the insured driver and the
insurance company. Prior to the first trial the insurance company offered
to settle for $10,000 on the daughter's cause of action for personal injury
and for $5000 on the parents' cause of action for emotional distress. The
policy provided coverage for bodily injury with limits of liability of
$10,000 per person or $20,000 per occurrence. The plaintiffs refused to
settle the lawsuit and the trial court granted judgment in favor of the par-
ents for $5,625, representing recovery for emotional distress.
The driver in the first action subsequently assigned to the plaintiffs, in
satisfaction of the judgment rendered against him, any and all claims he
might have against the insurance company for the company's failure to
settle the suit within the policy limits. The plaintiffs then filed a separate
action against the insurance company under the DTPA. The trial court
granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment. On ap-
peal, the court of appeals determined that no cause of action was available
under the DTPA because the daughter and her parents were not consum-
ers and therefore affirmed the trial court's summary judgment. 14 Recog-
nizing that a consumer is an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase
or lease any goods or services, the court determined that any right that the
plaintiffs might have under the DTPA must derive from the assignment of
the insured driver's cause of action against the insurance company. The
driver, who assigned the cause of action to the plaintiffs, was an additional
insured under his father's insurance policy. Since the person whose cause
of action was assigned to the plaintiffs neither sought nor acquired by
purchase or lease any goods or services from the defendant, the plaintiffs
were not, in the court's opinion, consumers entitled to protection under the
10. 644 S.W.2d at 535.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 642 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
14. Id at 279.
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DTPA.' 5 Additionally, the court determined that the alleged deceptive
practice of the insurance company in failing to settle the lawsuit within the
coverage limits was not involved in the sale of the insurance policy and as
such was not covered by the DTPA. 16
In Manufactured Housing Management Corp. v. Tubb 17 the purchaser of
a mobile home brought an action under the DTPA against the manufac-
turer and seller for damages resulting from defects in the construction of
the home. The seller cross, claimed against the manufacturer of the mo-
bile home under the DTPA for damages caused by the seller's reliance on
representations made by the manufacturer. The purchaser subsequently
accepted a cash settlement of its claims against the seller. The trial court
entered judgment for the purchaser and for the seller on its cross-claim
against the manufacturer. The seller's damages were trebled by the trial
court, and the manufacturer appealed. The court of appeals reversed the
award of treble damages to the seller on the theory that the seller was not a
consumer under the DTPA.18 The court relied on an earlier opinion of the
Tyler court of appeals that held that "it is reasonable to infer [from section
17.45 of the DTPA] that the purchase of goods for commercial purposes,
such as for resale or for use in the production of other goods, is not within
the contemplation of the DTPA. 19
Limitations on the applicability of the DTPA to oil and gas investments
were discussed by the court in Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.20 In
Hamilton the operator of an oil and gas well brought an action against a
nonoperating working interest owner to collect unpaid drilling costs. The
working interest owner filed a counterclaim against the operator for breach
of the joint operating agreement, negligence, and violations of the DTPA.
At trial the jury found that the operator was guilty of gross negligence
and had failed to perform its duties in a good and workmanlike manner.2'
Furthermore, the jury found that the operator had pursued an unconscion-
able course of action against the working interest owner and committed
other deceptive acts, and that the working interest owner was a con-
sumer.22 The jury granted the working interest owner $5000 in actual
damages, $10,000 in exemplary damages, and $50,000 in attorneys' fees.
The trial court disregarded the jury finding that the working interest owner
15. Id., American Ins. Cos. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1981,
no writ).
16. 642 S.W.2d at 280; see G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. 1929) (court allowed insured to recover from insurer entire amount of
judgment rendered against insured because insurer negligently failed to accept settlement
offer within liability limits of the insurance policy).
17. 643 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. Id at 487.
19. Ratcliff v. Trenholm, 596 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980), aft'd, 636
S.W.2d 718 (Tex. 1982).
20. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id. ; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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was a consumer under the DTPA and reduced the award of attorneys' fees.
The working interest owner appealed.
The court of appeals began its discussion of the working interest owner's
DTPA claim by defining the purchase of a good or service to involve the
"'[t]ransmission of property from one person to another by voluntary act
and agreement, founded on a valuable consideration.' ",23 The court, how-
ever, found this definition of purchase to be inadequate in the context of
services, which are defined as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased
for use."' 24 "For use" was further defined by the court to mean "' to put or
bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose.' "25
The working interest owner in Hamilton maintained that the operator was
paid for services rendered to the working interest owner including di-
recting and controlling all operations, paying costs, and providing man-
agement, bookkeeping, and supervision for the well. The court of appeals,
however, determined that the operator, under the terms of the joint operat-
ing agreement, was simply incurring debts for the operating and nonoper-
ating interests for which he was entitled to reimbursement. 26 The court
was swayed by the fact that the operator did not intend to make a profit for
the services it provided to the nonoperating working interest owner. Based
on its finding that the operator did not render services, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's determination that the working interest owners
were not consumers as contemplated in the DTPA.27
The working interest owner, relying on Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett,
Inc. ,28 also claimed that the operator would be liable even if it did not
render services under the DTPA because the operator had purchased
goods or services from its suppliers. The working interest owner con-
tended that the operator's dealings with its suppliers provided the basis for
the working interest owner's action against the operator. The court of ap-
peals disagreed. Although the court recognized that Cameron eliminated
the requirement of privity in actions under the DTPA, the court neverthe-
less found that the suppliers did not provide the services that formed the
basis of this complaint. The court therefore found Cameron inapplicable
and held that, as a matter of law, the working interest owner was not a
consumer of services under the DTPA.
29
The Texas Supreme Court further refined the defined scope of a con-
23. 648 S.W.2d at 322 (quoting Hall v. Bean, 582 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1979, no writ)).
24. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
25. 648 S.W.2d at 322 (quoting Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales, Inc., 609 S.W.2d
590, 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd)).
26. 648 S.W.2d at 322.
27. Id
28. 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981). In Cameron the supreme court examined the legisla-
tive history of the DTPA and determined that the Act was not restricted to deceptive trade
practices committed by the persons who actually furnished the goods or services on which
the complaint is based. Id at 539-41.
29. 648 S.W.2d at 322.
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sumer under the DTPA in White v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 30 In
White the owner of a floral shop brought suit against the telephone com-
pany for damages resulting from an incorrect listing of the shop owner's
telephone numbers in a directory. The telephone company sought and re-
ceived an instructed verdict in the trial court on its contention, among
others, that the shop owner was not a consumer within the meaning of the
DTPA. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on
other grounds. The supreme court reversed, holding that since the shop
owner sought and paid for additional phone lines and directory advertis-
ing, he was a consumer under the DTPA.31
The applicability of the DTPA to attorneys' services was considered in
First Municipal Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stew-
art, P. C. 32 In that case the plaintiff purchased from a lessor of computer
software and hardware the right to receive payments under a computer
lease, which the plaintiff later sold to a third party investor. The plaintiff
subsequently had to repurchase the lease from the third party after the
initial contract between the lessor and the lessee was found invalid. The
plaintiff then brought an action against the law firm that had issued a legal
opinion to the original lessor stating that the contract was valid. The dis-
trict court dismissed the plaintiffs action, which was based on theories of
negligence, violations of blue sky laws, and the DTPA. In affirming the
lower court's decision, the Dallas court of appeals held that because the
attorneys were hired by the original lessor of the computer to issue the
opinion and because the opinion was issued after the plaintiff took the
assignment, the plaintiff could not have relied on the opinion of the attor-
neys.33 The court also determined that the plaintiffs purchase of the con-
tract was not a consumer transaction for purposes of the DTPA.34 The
court found that the assignment purchased was an intangible rather than a
tangible item. In determining the definition of a "good" to be a "tangible"
item for the purposes of the DTPA, the court reasoned that an intangible
such as this contract was similar to an account receivable, which Texas
courts have previously held constitutes neither a good nor a service under
the DTPA.35
B. Damages
A number of decisions reported during the 1983 survey period dealt
with the proper measure and method of assessing damages in DTPA cases.
30. 651 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1983).
31. Id at 262.
32. 648 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Id at 418. Since the plaintiff did not rely on the attorney's opinion, he was not
adversely affected by the actions of the attorneys and was, therefore, not a consumer. See
Guerra v. Brumlow, 630 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
34. 648 S.W.2d at 417; see also South Tex. Irrigation Sys. v. Lockwood Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 256 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
35. 648 S.W.2d at 417; see also Snyders Smart Shop, Inc. v. Santi, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 167
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
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In Pope v. Rollins Protective Services Co. 36 a burglar alarm lessee brought
an action under the DTPA against the lessor and the installer of the bur-
glar alarm. The lessee sought recovery of damages for physical injury and
mental anguish sustained when she entered her home while a burglary was
in progress and none of the burglar alarm components had operated prop-
erly. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the lessee, and the lessor
appealed. The jury found the lessor liable for misrepresentation of the
characteristics of the alarm system in violation of section 17.46(b)(5) of the
DTPA,37 and for causing confusion regarding certain features of the sys-
tem in violation of section 17.46(b)(3) of the DTPA.38 The district court
further found that the lessor was grossly negligent in the installation and
design of the burglar alarm system and in its failure to warn that burglars
could disarm the system. The jury awarded the plaintiff $15,250 for loss of
property, $150,000 for past and future mental anguish, and $150,000 puni-
tive damages for Rollins's gross negligence. 39
On appeal, the lessor argued that the lessee presented no evidence or, at
most, insufficient evidence that the lessor's representations were the pro-
ducing causes of the lessee's mental anguish.4° Nevertheless, the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's decision allowing the lessee to recover under
the DTPA.4 1 The court stated that one of the primary reasons for the
enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers with a remedy for de-
ceptive trade practices without the burdens of proof and numerous de-
fenses encountered in a common law fraud or breach of warranty action.42
The court nonetheless determined that a putative plaintiff still must show
that the deceptive trade practice was the producing cause of the damage. 43
The court determined from the evidence that the natural results of the les-
sor's misrepresentations were the lessee's reliance on a deficient system and
the exploitation of those deficiencies by burglars to her detriment. The
court therefore concluded that the jury finding on the producing cause is-
sue was supported by evidence in the record. 44
36. 703 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983).
37. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1984) states that "repre-
senting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses,
benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval,
status, affiliation, or connection which he does not..." is sufficient to constitute "false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" and are unlawful conduct under the DTPA.
38. Id. § 17.46(b)(3).
39. 703 F.2d at 200.
40. For a consumer to be entitled to relief under § 17.50 of the DTPA, the prohibited
action must be the producing cause of actual damages. Producing cause is distinguished
from the requirement of proximate cause in tort by the fact that foreseeability is not an
element of the former, while the latter consists of two elements: (1) cause-in-fact; and (2)
forseeability. See id at 202 n.4.
41. Id at 201.
42. Id; see Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980); Woo v. Great Sw. Accept-
ance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
43. 703 F.2d at 202; see City of Marshall v. Bryant Air Conditioning, 650 F.2d 724 (5th
Cir. 1981).
44. 703 F.2d at 203. The district court gave the following instruction on the definition
1984]
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The lessor in Pope also contended that as a matter of law the lessee was
not entitled to recover for mental anguish under the DTPA. In response,
the court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has construed the actual
damages that are provided for under section 17.50 of the DTPA to mean
those damages that are recoverable at common law.45 Under Texas com-
mon law, damages for mental anguish cannot be recovered absent a show-
ing of an intentional tort, gross negligence, willful and wanton disregard,
or accompanying physical injury.46 The Fifth Circuit determined that
since the appellee introduced sufficient evidence of physical injury to re-
cover damages for mental anguish, the jury's finding with respect to dam-
ages for mental anguish should be sustained.47
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Stice48 suit was brought to
recover proceeds of an accidental death and dismemberment policy on the
life of the plaintiffs deceased husband. The policy was initially issued by
the defendant insurance company to the wife's employer. The plaintiff
also sought treble damages from her employer for engaging in deceptive
and misleading practices in violation of the Texas Insurance Code49 and
the DTPA.50 The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the
insurance company and the employer appealed. The appellate court re-
versed the lower court's decision in part and ruled that the plaintiff could
not recover damages from the employer based on a misrepresentation in
the employer's brochure dealing with accidental death and dismember-
ment benefits since plaintiff successfully recovered benefits under the pol-
icy. 51 Because the jury found the policy to be in full force and effect, the
court reasoned that the plaintiff incurred no actual damages, thus preclud-
ing recovery of treble damages under the DTPA.52
In Litton Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gammage53 the plaintiff brought
suit for severe personal injuries and damages sustained when a ratchet
manufactured by one of the defendants failed while being used by the
plaintiff. The suit was brought on the bases of negligence, strict liability,
and deceptive trade practices under the DTPA. The case was tried to a
jury, and the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum in
excess of $700,000 in actual damages,which was trebled by the trial court
of producing cause: "The term producing cause means an efficient, exciting or contributing
cause, which in a natural sequence, produces the injuries or damages complained of, if any,
and without which the injury would not have occurred." Id at 202.
45. Id at 203; see Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939
(Tex.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
46. Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1981).
47. 703 F.2d at 204.
48. 640 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
49. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4 (Vernon 1981).
50. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
51. 640 S.W.2d at 960; see Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d
688, 695 (Tex. 1979).
52. 640 S.W.2d at 960.
53. 644 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), af'd inpart, rev'din part,
27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 166 (Jan. 11, 1984).
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pursuant to the DTPA.54 The defendant argued on appeal that the DTPA
does not apply to personal injury damages and that the trial court there-
fore erred in trebling the damages. The appellate court, however, found
that actual damages recoverable under the DTPA include damages for
personal injury.55 Citing the Texas Supreme Court's allowance of treble
damages for mental anguish in Woods v. Littleton,56 the court found no
justifiable reason to treble mental anguish damages in a non-personal in-
jury case and not to treble damages in a personal injury case.5 7 The Texas
Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the court of appeals holding with re-
spect to treble damages. The DTPA only applies to acts or practices occur-
ring after May 21, 1973, the effective date of the Act.58 The supreme court
held that because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing that the
defendant manufactured the defective ratchet after the effective date, no
violation of the DTPA was established.5 9
The Houston court of appeals also dealt with the question of the scope
of damages recoverable under the DTPA in Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v.
Hall.60 In Mahan the plaintiff's daughter was killed in an automobile ac-
cident, and the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, dealer, and
distributor of the car to recover for the fatal injuries on theories of prod-
ucts liability and violation of the DTPA. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff in excess of $400,000 in actual damages, which the
court trebled pursuant to the DTPA.61 The jury found that the dealer
failed to disclose to the decedent that the car's brakes were defective and
that such failure was a deceptive act that was the producing cause of the
injury. The dealer appealed.
Since its enactment in 1973, the DTPA has been amended in every legis-
lative session. The legislative history of the DTPA indicates that during
the 1979 session of the legislature several efforts were made to redefine the
term "actual damages" so as to eliminate personal injury cases from its
scope. The 1979 legislature rejected all of these proposed amendments.
The court of appeals in Mahan determined that it was bound to consider
the rejection of the amendments as reflective of the legislature's satisfac-
tion with the broader applicability of the term "actual damages. '62 Ac-
cording to the court, the decedent occupied the status of a consumer, and a
cause of action under the DTPA for personal injury and property damage
passed under the wrongful death statute to her heirs and the legal repre-
54. 644 S.W.2d at 171.
55. Id at 173. The statute is to be liberally construed and applied pursuant to § 17.44.
Section 17.50 of the 1973 version clearly states that "each consumer who prevails may ob-
tain: (1) three times the amount of actual damages." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1973).
56. 544 S.W.2d 662, 671 (Tex. 1977).
57. 644 S.W.2d at 173-74.
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
59. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 166, 168 (Jan. 11, 1984).
60. 648 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
61. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
62. 648 S.W.2d at 332;see Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1981).
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sentatives of her estate. 63 The court on rehearing, however, limited the
amount of damages attributable to the decedent's cause of action to dam-
ages for physical pain and mental anguish, funeral expenses, and property
damage. Since no evidence of physical pain and mental anguish was in-
troduced at trial, the only damages that were properly trebled under the
DTPA were the decedent's funeral expenses and automobile damages.64
In Whir/pool Corp. v. Texical, Inc. 65 a refrigerator manufacturer brought
suit against one of its purchasers to recover on a sworn account, where-
upon the buyer counterclaimed for damages under the DTPA. The jury
found that the seller committed a false, misleading, or deceptive act or
practice in connection with the sale of the refrigerators. The court trebled
the actual damages incurred by the buyer and ordered the sale rescinded.
On appeal the seller contended that the trial court erred in allowing both
recovery of treble damages under the DTPA and a rescission of the sales
contract. The seller challenged the trial court's award on the basis of the
opinion in Smith v. Kinslow.66 In Smith the trial court awarded the plain-
tiff actual damagesplus three times actual damages under the DTPA for a
breach of warranty regarding repairs. Concerned about the effect of qua-
drupling the damages, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judg-
ment and held that "in a suit for breach of warranty, the complaining
party may recover three times his actual damages under subdivision (1) [of
section 17.50(b)] or restoration of the consideration paid under subdivision
(3), but not both."' 67 Distinguishing the Smith opinion, the court in Whirl-
pool found that the trial court's award relied on two different theories and
two events. Also, the court did not face the problem of excessive recovery
that existed in Smith, since the trial court ordered the buyer to return the
refrigerators to the seller, thereby granting the buyer rescission. The court
therefore held that granting partial recission and awarding treble damages
under the DTPA are not incompatible. 68
In North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna 69 the buyer purchased a car
from a dealer with the understanding that the car was covered by a limited
money-back guarantee. When the dealer refused to honor its warranty
obligations, the buyer brought suit alleging various violations of the
DTPA.70 The buyer also sought treble damages against the dealer under
the section of the DTPA that requires a plaintiff to establish that the con-
duct of the defendant was committed knowingly. 71 In an attempt to prove
63. 648 S.W.2d at 333; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1941-1983), 5525 (Vernon 1958); see also Rodriquez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 598
S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
64. 648 S.W.2d at 334.
65. 649 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
66. 598 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
67. Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
68. 649 S.W.2d at 57.
69. 653 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 27 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 271 (Mar. 14, 1984).
70. The buyer alleged violations of TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46(b)(5),
.46(b)(7), .46(b)(12), .50(a)(2), .50(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
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that the dealer acted knowingly, the buyer's attorney questioned the
dealer's finance manager about the dealer's financial solvency. The dealer
objected and moved for a mistrial, contending that the issue of motive was
irrelevant. The court denied the motion, which ruling was one of several
points of error precipitating an appeal. Since the consumer sought treble
damages under section 17.50(b)(1) of the DTPA, which requires knowing
commission of an act by the defendant, 72 the court of appeals determined
that an inquiry into the possibility of the dealer's impending bankruptcy
was relevant to the motive of the dealer in refusing to refund a portion of
the purchase price demanded by the consumer. 73
In Keller Industries, Inc. v. Reeves74 the plaintiff brought suit alleging
causes of action under the doctrine of strict liability in tort and the DTPA
against a retailer and manufacturer of an aluminum stepladder for injuries
incurred when the stepladder failed while being used by the plaintiff. The
defendants appealed from a trial court judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
They argued that the trial court improperly applied the DTPA in trebling
damages and awarding attorneys' fees, on the theory that a set of facts that
gives rise to a cause of action in strict liability for a defective product can-
not also be the subject of a claim for personal injuries under the DTPA.
The appellants' argument relied upon extensive references to the legisla-
tive history of the DTPA and lengthy quotes from the testimony of non-
legislator proponents of the original legislation. In affirming the judgment
of the trial court, 75 the court quoted from the opinion in Litton Industrial
Products v. Gammage.76
"It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the
courts only look behind the law as to legislative intent and public pol-
icy where the statute is unclear, uncertain or ambiguous . . . . If
there is no ambiguity, the statute itself is the public policy. We are of
the opinion that the DTPA is clear and unambiguous and, therefore,
it is not necessary to consider legislative intent beyond that expressly
stated in the statute itself ....
"The DTPA clearly states that all actual damages are to be trebled,
regardless of whether they are personal injury or property damages.
Upon our review of the applicable legislative history, we found that
(b) In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may obtain:
(I) the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact. In addition
the court shall award two times that portion of the actual damages that does
not exceed $1,000. If the trier of fact finds the conduct of the defendant was
committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more than three times
the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000 ....
(Emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. 653 S.W.2d at 896. The court also considered and sustained the seller's assertion
that the trial court improperly allowed recovery for mental anguish and loss of use of the
vehicle. 1d at 897-901.
74. 656 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
75. Id. at 229.
76. 644 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), afd in part, rev'd in part,
27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 166 (Jan. 11, 1984); see supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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the purpose of the DTPA was to deter that behavior expressly prohib-
ited by the DTPA. It would be totally illogical to conclude that the
prohibited practices are better deterred by trebling property damage
awards than by trebling personal injury awards. We can only, in all
reasonableness, conclude that it is in keeping with the deterrent func-
tion of the DTPA to treble personal injury damages when the proper
circumstances warrant it .... .,77
C Defenses
During the 1983 survey period, Texas courts also were faced with vari-
ous defenses to liability under the DTPA. In Wayne Strand Pontiac-GMC
v. Molia 78 an appeal was taken from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against an automobile dealership in a suit under the DTPA, the Con-
sumer Credit Code, and the Federal Truth in Lending Act resulting from
interest charges incurred in the purchase of a vehicle. The trial court ren-
dered judgment for twice the amount of the finance charge incurred by the
plaintiff. The dealer contended that the irregularity in the contract was de
minimis because the contract overcharged interest to the plaintiff in the
amount of $5.53 and asserted an improper charge of only $2.50 for official
fees. The court of appeals determined as a matter of law that the
overcharges in these amounts were de minimis.79 A dissenting judge ar-
gued that in applying the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex a distinction
should be drawn between overcharges that result from miscalculations of
proper charges and charges that were never authorized and that therefore
constitute actionable misrepresentations. 80 The majority of the court,
however, did not believe that such a distinction should control, finding that
the name of the doctrine itself demonstrates that it is a doctrine of conven-
ience, which has as its purpose the relief of the courts from trivial matters.
As such, in the court's opinion, the defense should not be restricted to a
limited class of transactions. 8'
In Miro v. Allied Finance Co. 82 the in-house counsel for a corporation
executed several promissory notes in favor of the corporation. Payments
on the notes were to be made by payroll deductions or by counsel's per-
sonal check. After counsel's employment with the corporation terminated,
he brought an action against the corporation alleging that the loans made
to him by the corporation violated the Consumer Credit Code and were
77. 656 S.W.2d at 224 (quoting 644 S.W.2d at 175, 176).
78. 653 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. Id. at 46-47; see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Long, 608 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Zapata, 605 S.W.2d 362,
366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980), rev'don other grounds, 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981);
Thornhill v. Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, no writ).
80. 653 S.W.2d at 49 (Bissett, J. dissenting).
81. Id. at 47.
82. 650 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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usurious. 8 3 The corporation counterclaimed, alleging that the lawyer had
breached his fiduciary duty and demanding repayment of the unpaid loan
balance. On appeal of the judgment rendered in favor of the corporation
on its counterclaim, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err
in holding that the corporation's charging of usurious interest rates on
notes payable by counsel through payroll deductions was bona fide error,
and that counsel was not entitled to recover on his usury claim since coun-
sel had drafted the loan agreements in question and had a fiduciary duty,
which he breached, to bring a usury problem to the attention of the corpo-
ration.84 After reviewing cases concerning the bona fide error defense, the
appellate court found that Texas courts have interpreted statutory bona
fide error clauses in the Consumer Credit Code to hold harmless those
lenders who accidentally and inadvertently charge and collect usurious in-
terest.85 The record contained nothing suggesting that the lending prac-
tices of the appellee were even remotely abusive or deceptive. Since the
legislative history clearly indicates that the Consumer Credit Code was
passed to prevent abusive or deceptive practices, the court found it permis-
sible to excuse the lender from liability under the bona fide error
defense. 86
In Miller v. Soliz8 7 the defendant raised the defenses of good faith and
bona fide error in an action against him for violation of the DTPA. In
Miller the Solizes purchased an automobile from the defendant and ten-
dered a $1500 cash down payment, for which they were given a receipt and
credit, and a retail order for a motor vehicle. Immediately thereafter, the
defendant agreed to exchange the automobile purchased for another auto-
mobile, and the Solizes made an additional $465 down payment. The par-
ties subsequently executed a motor vehicle contract that included financing
for the second vehicle and reflected the $1500 initial down payment, but
gave no credit for the second $465 down payment.
The defendant did not deny the violation charged under the Consumer
Credit Code, but relied instead upon the bona fide error defense.88 To
take advantage of this defense, the defendant must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the purported violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error, and that such error occurred notwithstand-
ing the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such viola-
tion.89 The court determined that the second element of the bona fide
error defense, adoption and maintenance of preventive procedures, was
83. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.06, 5069-8.01 (Vernon 1971 & Supp.
1984).
84. 650 S.W.2d at 942.
85. Id
86. Id see PJM, Inc. v. Walter Clark Advertising, 624 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. 648 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(f) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1984) makes
violation of the usury law due solely to bona fide error a valid defense.
89. 648 S.W.2d at 737; see Ballard v. Hillcrest State Bank, 592 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refed n.r.e.).
1984]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
not expressly presented to the trial court and ruled therefore that a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs should be sustained.90 The de-
fendant also challenged the court's ruling that the defendant pursued an
unconscionable course of action in violation of section 17.50(a)(3) of the
DTPA.9' The defendant's response to the Solizes' motion for summary
judgment stated that the acts were unintentional, were committed in good
faith, and resulted from bona fide error. The court, however, determined
that intent was not an element of section 17.50(a)(3) and held that the de-
fenses of good faith and bona fide error were not available.92
D. Notice
In Foster v. Daon Corp. 93 the Fifth Circuit heard an appeal from a judg-
ment rendered in favor of a seller who was sued by a condominium pur-
chaser for reduction of a contract purchase price and for relief under the
DTPA. At trial the condominium purchaser's claim under the DTPA was
held barred by the fact that the purchaser failed to make a demand on the
seller for the claimed damages before filing the suit.94 When the seller
asserted this defense in its answer, the purchaser moved to amend the com-
plaint by dismissing the DTPA claim without prejudice. Dismissal of the
DTPA claim in this manner would have allowed the purchaser to give the
required demand thirty days before reinstituting the claim in court. The
district court, however, denied the purchaser's request to amend the com-
plaint.95 The district court noted that the purpose of the DTPA thirty-day
demand requirement is to encourage voluntary settlement,96 but denied
the purchaser's motion to amend, stating:
Normally, leave to file amended pleadings is to be freely given...
However, notice is a prerequisite to bringing an action under
§ 17.50(b)(1) . . . and the Court has concluded that no notice was
given in this case. Since the DTPA claims were brought improperly
thereby frustrating the underlying purpose of § 17.50A, the Court is of
the opinion that the motion to amend should be denied. 97
The purchaser also filed a second motion to amend in the trial court con-
cerning the claim under the DTPA. While the first complaint was pend-
90. 648 S.W.2d at 738.
91. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
92. 648 S.W.2d at 738; see Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980); Sam
Kane Beef Processors, Inc. v. Manning, 601 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, no writ).
93. 713 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 151. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(a) (Vernon 1984) requires that
before a suit is filed seeking damages under § 17.50(b)(1) against any person, a consumer
must give written notice to the person at least 30 days before filing advising the person of the
specific complaint and the amount of actual damages and expenses, including attorneys'
fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the consumer in asserting the claim.
95. 713 F.2d at 151.
96. Id at 151; see also Barnado v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, writ ref d n.r.e.); Goodfriend & Lynn, Of White Knights and Black Knights.- An Analy-
sis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 33 Sw. L.J. 941, 988-
96 (1979).
97. 713 F.2d at 151-52.
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ing, the purchaser sent the defendant a notice of demand based on a
separate violation of the DTPA and, less than thirty days thereafter,
moved to amend the complaint to add this second claim under the DTPA.
Although the thirty days required by section 17.50A had not yet passed,
the purchaser was concerned that the two-year statute of limitations would
run on the second complaint before the thirty-day waiting period ex-
pired. 98 The district court nonetheless again denied leave to amend to in-
clude this complaint because the purchaser failed to give the required
thirty-day notice.99
On appeal the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court acted in-
correctly in denying the motions to amend. Citing its prior opinion in Chi-
timacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co. ,io the court stated that:
In exercising its discretion, the trial court should consider whether
permitting the amendment would cause undue delay in the proceed-
ings or undue prejudice to the nonmoving party, whether the movant
is acting in bad faith or with a dilatory motive, or whether the movant
has previously failed to cure deficiencies in his pleadings by prior
amendments. The court may weigh in the movant's favor any
prejudice that might arise from the denial of leave to amend. In keep-
ing with the purposes of the rule, the court should consider judicial
economy and whether the amendments would lead to expeditious dis-
position of the merits of the litigation. Finally, the court should con-
sider whether the amendment adds substance to the original
allegations, and whether it is germane to the original cause of
action. 10
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
denying both motions to amend, finding no indication in the record that
the proposed amendments would cause delay or undue prejudice to the
defendant because the case was still in the pretrial stage, no indication that
the purchaser's motives to amend were brought in bad faith or for the
purpose of delay, and, most significantly, finding that the purchaser suf-
fered great prejudice through the district court's denial of leave to amend
due to the running of the statute of limitations on the DTPA claims. The
court therefore reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. 102
In Cameo Construction Co. v. Campbell1 0 3 a dispute arose between
homeowners and a construction company and its president over a written
contract to construct a residence. The homeowners filed suit against the
construction company and its president under the DTPA. The president
subsequently filed a counterclaim on his own behalf under section 17.50(c)
98. Section 17.50A(b) provides that the 30-day notice requirement is waived if giving
the notice "is rendered impracticable by reason of the necessity of filing suit in order to
revent the expiration of the statute of limitations." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
17.50A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
99. 713 F.2d at 152.
100. 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 69, 73 L. Ed. 2d 83
(1983).
101. 713 F.2d at 152.
102. Id
103. 642 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
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of the DTPA, which allows an award of attorneys' fees when an action
under the DTPA is groundless and brought in bad faith, or brought for the
purpose of harassment.' 0 4 The homeowners thereafter were granted a mo-
tion for nonsuit as to the president only, and the trial court dismissed the
president's DTPA counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment for the
homeowners, and the construction company and its president appealed.
The court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in striking a counter-
claim by the building contractor's president to recover attorneys' fees
under the DTPA, even though the homeowners eliminated all claims
against the president under the DTPA by amending their pleadings.10 5
The court determined that a counterclaim asserting that a claim under the
DTPA was groundless and brought in bad faith, or brought for the pur-
pose of harassment, should not be dismissed simply because the original
claim was not prosecuted to a conclusion. 0 6
The building contractor also asserted that the homeowners were not en-
titled to recover under the DTPA because the homeowners failed to com-
ply with the notice provisions of the controlling earlier version of the
DTPA.10 7 The claimed breach of the 1976 contract was controlled by the
1973 provisions of the DTPA, which required notice only of suits brought
as class actions under section 17.51 of the 1973 version of the DTPA. I0 8
Under the 1973 version, no notice was required for suits brought under
section 17.50 of the DTPA, which provided general relief for individual
consumers.109 The court therefore determined that the district court erred
in dismissing the homeowner's claim under the DTPA based on failure to
give notice under section 17.53(a)."10
II. THE CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
The 1983 survey period saw reduced activity by Texas courts in the in-
terpretation of the terms and provisions of the Texas Consumer Credit
Code."I In North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna" 2 the defendant auto
dealer claimed that the trial court erred in holding that a retail installment
contract entered into between a buyer and an auto dealer violated article
5069-7.07(7) of the Consumer Credit Code.' 13 Article 5069-7.07(7) pro-
hibits an installment contract from including a provision allowing the
seller to retain or dispose of tangible personal property that is not subject
104. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1984).
105. 642 S.W.2d at 12.
106. Id
107. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.53(a) (Vernon 197 1), repealedby Act of May 23,
1977, ch. 216, § 12, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600, 605 (effective May 23, 1977).
108. Id. § 17.53.
109. Id.; see King v. Ladd, 624 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
110. 642 S.W.2d at 12.
111. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.01 to -51.17 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp.
1971-1983).
112. 653 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983), rev'd in part, afl'd in part, 27 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 271 (Mar. 14, 1984).
113. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(7) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
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to a security interest. 1 4 The installment agreement in question allowed
the seller to take possession of any other items in the automobile at the
time of repossession. 1 5 After interpreting this contract provision to be vi-
olative of the provisions and requirements of article 5069-7.07(7), the
trial court levied the statutory penalty of $2000 against the defendant. 1 6
On appeal, the court determined that the contractual provision allowing
the seller to take possession of any other items in the property at the time
of possession and to hold them without liability until demand constituted
the retention of unsecured tangible personal property as contemplated by
article 5069-7.07(7). 117 Accordingly, the contract's failure to require the
seller or holder to send the appropriate written notice supported the award
of damages pursuant to article 5069-8.01(b)."18
In Miller v. Soliz 19 the court ruled that the bona fide error defense
under article 5069-8.01(f) of the Consumer Credit Code involves a two-
prong test requiring proof of the bona fide error and procedures adopted to
avoid such errors. 120 In affirming the summary judgment rendered against
the seller, the court determined that the nonmovant in summary judgment
proceedings, in answer or response, must expressly present those issues,
and proof of them if necessary, that would defeat the movant's right to
summary judgment.' 2' In the summary judgment proceeding before the
trial court the seller pled that the violation was not intentional and resulted
from bona fide error, but failed to allege or prove that reasonable preven-
tive procedures were adopted and maintained. The second part of the
bona fide error defense therefore was not considered on appeal, and the
114. Article 5069-7.07(7) provides:
No retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall:
(7) Contain an authorization for the seller or holder or any person acting on
the seller's or holder's behalf to retain or dispose of other tangible personal
property that is not subject to a security interest and that is acquired in the
repossession of a motor vehicle, except property attached to the vehicle, unless
the contract or a separate writing requires the seller or holder to send written
notice of such an acquisition to the last known address of the buyer as shown
by the records of the holder within fifteen days of the discovery of the personal
property by the seller or holder.
Id.
115. The contract provided:
Seller his agents or representatives, may enter the premises where the property
may be and take immediate possession of the property including any equip-
ment or accessories, and Seller may take possession of any other items in the
property at the time of the repossession, and hold them without liability until
demanded by the buyer.
653 S.W.2d at 900.
116. Id; see TEX. REV. Civ. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
117. 653 S.W.2d at 901.
118. Id
119. 648 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); see supra notes 87-92
and accompanying text.
120. 648 S.W.2d at 737; see Ballard v. Hillcrest State Bank, 592 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
121. 648 S.W.2d at 738; see City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin, 589 S.W.2d 671, 679
(Tex. 1979).
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court affirmed the summary judgment granted in favor of the buyer for
violation of the Consumer Credit Code. 122
In Northwest Bank v. Couie 123 lender brought suit for an amount alleg-
edly due on an unpaid promissory note, and the borrowers counterclaimed
alleging violations of the Consumer Credit Code. The lender had
purchased two credit life policies to secure the borrowers' promissory note.
The total premiums charged by the two insurance companies, however,
were identical to the premium that would have been charged if only one
policy had been issued. Article 5069-4.02(1) of the Consumer Credit
Code provides that:
[o]n any loan made under the authority of [Chapter 4 "Installment
Loans"], a lender may request or require a borrower to provide credit
life insurance and credit health and accident insurance as additional
protection for such a loan. Only one policy of life insurance and one
Folicy of health and accident insurance on any one obligor may be in
orce with respect to any one loan contract at any one time. 124
The trial court rendered judgment against the lender on the counterclaim
and granted the plaintiffs twice the amount of interest contracted for in the
note. On appeal, the lender, relying on a prior version of article 5069-
8.01 of the Consumer Credit Code, argued that since article 5069-4.02(l)
imposes no specific duty on the lender, the lender did not violate the
Code. 125 The appellate court found the bank's reliance on old article
5069-8.01 to be misplaced. Although the older version required that a
lender must fail to perform a duty specifically imposed on it, the amended
version of article 5069-8.01(b) triggers the punitive sanctions whenever
prohibited acts are proven. 126
The lender in Couie also contended that it had not violated the Con-
sumer Credit Code because the total of the premiums charged by the two
insurance companies was identical to the premium that would have been
charged if only one credit life insurance policy had been issued. The bor-
rowers, therefore, could not prove that they had been injured by the acts of
the lender in causing two policies to be issued. The appellate court deter-
mined that this equitable contention was without merit because the situa-
tion was controlled specifically by statute. 127 The court found that the
legislature had directed the courts in Texas to impose the penalties pro-
vided by article 5069-8.01 when any act or practice prohibited by the
statute was comitted. Specifically, the court determined that the legislature
intended to deter lenders or creditors from taking out more than one policy
of credit life or health and accident insurance with respect to any one obli-
122. 648 S.W.2d at 738.
123. 642 S.W.2d at 847 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.02(1) (Vernon 1968).
125. Id. art. 5069-8.01(b) (Vernon 1967).
126. 642 S.W.2d at 850;see TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(b) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1983).
127. 642 S.W.2d at 851.
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gor at any one time.' 28 Furthermore, the court reasoned that private en-
forcement of the Consumer Credit Code would be deterred and consumers
would be forced to meet a defense that had not been provided by statute if
courts accepted the lender's harmless violation argument. 129 Finding that
the defenses available to lenders are limited specifically to those enumer-
ated in the Consumer Credit Code, the court was powerless to expand such
defenses by judicial fiat. 130
Lastly, the bank contended that the borrowers were estopped from as-
serting liability under article 5069-4.02(1) because they were not injured.
The lender noted that the borrowers permitted the insurance companies to
effectively retire their obligations under the note with the proceeds of the
policies. The court determined that both parties benefited from the two
insurance policies; the bank was repaid monies lent to the borrowers, and
the borrowers satisfied their financial obligation to the lender by opting for
credit life and disability insurance. The lender, however, being the benefi-
ciary of the credit policies, was in a superior position to discover any error
or to avoid statutory liability. The court therefore determined that estop-
pel did not lie in this case.13 1
In Machado v. Crestview Mobile Housing 32 the court reviewed a clause
in a retail installment contract. The subject clause provided that if a pur-
chaser continued to make payments to a seller after the retail installment
contract was assigned to a third party, the purchaser's right to assert the
defense of payment to the primary obligee would be waived in a suit by
the assignee for payment irrespective of whether notice of the assignment
was provided to the purchaser. The trial court rendered judgment for the
seller-assignor, and the purchaser brought an appeal. The purchaser as-
serted that the trial court erred in failing to hold that the retail installment
contract violated article 5069---6.07 of the Consumer Credit Code, which
provides that unless the buyer has notice of assignment or negotiation of
his retail installment contract, any payment made to the last known holder
is binding upon any subsequent holders. 133
The purchasers also argued that the contract provision clearly violated
article 5069--6.05(6) of the Consumer Credit Code, which prohibits con-
tract provisions stating that a buyer agrees not to assert any claim or de-
fense arising out of the sale against the seller. The court sustained the
purchaser's contentions, finding the contract clause to be violative of arti-
cles 5069-6.07134 and 5069--6.05(6). 13
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 249, 254-55 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. 642 S.W.2d at 851; see also Barfield v. Howard M. Smith Co., 426 S.W.2d 834, 838-
39 (Tex. 1968).
132. 650 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
133. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--6.07 (Vernon 1971).
134. 650 S.W.2d at 495; see Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nichols, 529 S.W.2d 588 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
1984]
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
In Haley v. Pagan Lewis Motors, Inc. 136 the purchaser of an automobile
brought suit against the automobile dealer for violation of the Consumer
Credit Code. The purchaser argued that certain terms of the form install-
ment sales contract prevented the purchaser from asserting any defenses he
might have against the seller against any subsequent assignee of the con-
tract. The district court entered judgment for the dealer and the purchaser
appealed.
The court of appeals examined the contract terms challenged by the pur-
chaser and compared them with seemingly contradictory language in bold
face print found on the reverse side of the contract. The appellate court
determined that if a contract, by its terms and construed as a whole, is
susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, courts are obligated
to adopt a construction that comports with legality. 37 In the instant case
the court held that under a reasonable construction of the entire contract
the buyer had the right to assert against the seller and any subsequent
holder all claims and defenses available under Texas law. The court there-
fore found no violation of the Consumer Credit Code.138
III. USURY
.4. Statutory Provisions
The maximum lawful rates that creditors may charge debtors for the
use, forbearance, or retention of money are governed by article 5069-1.01
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.' 39 Under the usury statutes, any
lender charging more than the highest lawful rate is subject to forfeiture of
three times the amount of excess interest charged, with a minimum penalty
of $2000 or twenty percent of the principal.140 If the interest charged ex-
ceeds twice the lawful rate, the lender is subject to forfeiture of all princi-
pal plus twice the amount of interest charged.' 4' If a lender has charged
interest absent an agreement, or if charging interest is not statutorily per-
mitted, courts interpret the interest so charged to exceed twice the legally
permissible amount.' 42 The lender, therefore, is subject to forfeiture of
twice the interest charged and all. debt principal. The usury statutes also
provide that a lender who charges interest in excess of the lawful rate must
135. 650 S.W.2d at 495; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.05(6) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1983); see also Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
136. 647 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
137. Id. at 320.
138. Id. ;see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McDaniel, 613 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grant v. Friendly Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 612
S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
139. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971). The Texas usury
statutes were substantially revised in 1981 to raise significantly the permissible interest ceil-
ings on loans. Nonetheless, except for the numerical interest rate involved, all cases cited
herein that involve decisions under the former law should continue to be valid legal prece-
dent for contracts and actions undertaken prior to 1981 as well as for most future case
decisions.
140. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
141. Id art. 5096-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
142. See Biggs v. Garrett, 651 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
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pay the borrower's attorneys' fees. 143 Otherwise, most borrowers could not
afford to protest usurious charges. 144 Because the statute is penal in na-
ture, a court cannot award the statutory penalty and also require that the
creditor pay the borrower additional damages. 145
B. Case Law
Definition of Interest. The threshold question in determining whether
charges by a lender are usurious is whether the charge in question consti-
tutes interest. Interest is statutorily defined as "the compensation allowed
by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money."' 46 During the
past year, three cases have considered whether particular charges consti-
tuted interest. In Couch v. Mallory 147 the Corpus Christi court of appeals
ruled that a mortgage company that charged brokerage or origination fees
on notes in addition to charging interest at the highest lawful rate commit-
ted usury. The court noted that the essential elements of a usurious trans-
action are: (1) a loan of money; (2) an absolute obligation that the
principal be repaid; and (3) the exaction of a greater compensation than
allowed by law for the use of the money. 148 The court treated the loan
origination fee as compensation for the use of money, which when added
to the interest charged on the face of the notes made the transaction
usurious. 1
49
Similarly, in Goldring v. Texas Commerce Bank-Arlington' 50 the Fort
Worth court of appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of the
lender and held that where a borrower agreed to pay costs of collection up
to ten percent of the principal and interest owing on the note in the event
of default, and the lender charged the borrower with its actual attorneys'
fees, which exceeded the agreed amount, the excess attorneys' fees charged
might be construed as interest on the note.' 51 The court held that the bor-
rower was not required to prove the existence of a corrupt scheme or an
agreement to circumvent the usury law, because the borrower was not
complaining of usury on the basis of the note, but for charges in excess of
the amount agreed to on the note. 152 Although the note was not usurious
on its face, if the borrower shows usurious charges on the basis of the en-
tire transaction, including excess attorneys' fees, a lack of intent by the
lender to charge a usurious rate of interest is not a defense. 153 The court
143. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
144. See Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
145. Tri-County Farmer's Co-op v. Bendele, 641 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. 1982).
146. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 (Vernon 1971).
147. 638 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, writ dism'd).
148. Id. at 182 (citing Holly v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982)).
149. 638 S.W.2d at 182.
150. 651 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 203 (Feb.
8, 1984).
151. Id at 364.
152. Id at 363.
153. Id. at 363-64.
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remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the excess attor-
neys' fees were contracted for or were payment for the use, forbearance, or
detention of money.
In Meyer v. Mack Sales, Inc. 154 the Corpus Christi court of appeals de-
termined that a charge designated as floor plan interest by a truck dealer
was not a charge for the use, detention, or forbearance of money and
therefore did not constitute true interest within the meaning of the usury
statutes. In Meyer the plaintiff purchased several trucks from the dealer in
May 1978, but due to special rigging ordered by the plaintiff the trucks
were not delivered until September 1978. Upon delivery, the dealer
presented an itemized invoice to the plaintiff that included a charge de-
nominated floor plan interest. The charge was computed on a basis of ten
percent of the total purchase price per annum prorated for the four months
between purchase and delivery. The plaintiff subsequently brought suit
contending that the ten percent charge was usurious. The trial court
granted the dealer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
the plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals began its inquiry by determining what constitutes
interest. The court stated that forbearance of the use of money occurs
when a debt is due or is to become due and the parties agree to extend the
time of its payment. 155 In Meyer the parties agreed that full payment for
the vehicles, including floor plan interest, would be due upon delivery.
The court reasoned that since no forbearance was present, no charging of
interest within the meaning of the usury statute existed. 156
Calculation of the Rate of Interest. During the past year three cases were
decided involving the calculation of the actual rate of interest charged. In
Conte v. Greater Houston Bank 1.7 a borrower on a real estate lien note
sued the lender, alleging that the lender's deduction of $17,000 as a broker-
age fee when the note was made constituted usury when combined with
the lender's requirement that the borrower maintain compensating deposit
balances and the lender's contractual right to demand payment of the en-
tire balance at its discretion. The court of appeals ruled that the $17,000
deducted from the funds advanced could not be classified as brokerage fee
if no third party was involved in the transaction, and that amount there-
fore constituted prepaid interest.'58 The court noted, however, that under
the rule of Nevels v. Harris 159 prepaid interest could be spread over the
entire term of the note to determine whether the interest charged was usu-
154. 645 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
155. Id. at 495 (citing Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322 (1899)).
156. 645 S.W.2d at 495.
157. 641 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
158. Id. at 415.
159. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937). InNevels the lender took the borrower's note
for $6400, deducted $320, and loaned the borrower only $6080. The court treated the $320
as interest and added it to the stated interest of eight percent. Nevertheless, when the $320
was spread over the entire term of the note, the total interest charged was not usurious.
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rious. 16 0 By spreading the $17,000 brokerage fee over the fifteen-year term
of the note, the total interest charged including the stated interest rate was
less than the statutory maximum. Although the note was callable at the
lender's discretion, the court noted that the note contained a savings provi-
sion that stated: "[I1n no event shall any interest payable under this note,
regardless of how said interest may be defined or computed, ever exceed
the maximum rate permitted under the laws of the State of Texas."' 6' The
court held that this provision was sufficient to make the note nonusurious
despite the lender's demand option. 62 The court further held that a re-
quirement for maintaining compensating balances did not reduce the
amount of loan principal for computing the rate of interest charged if the
depositor received interest on the deposits and was allowed to and did cash
in the certificates of deposit without restraint. 63
The Nevels spreading doctrine can also be applied retrospectively. Al-
though interest assessed on a past due debt may seem usurious, creditors
are entitled to spread the interest charges backwards to include any previ-
ous period for which interest could have been assessed. During the past
year, two decisions held that courts must consider the entire time period
for which a creditor may lawfully charge interest on an amount past due,
not just the time period during which the creditor has actually charged
interest, to determine whether interest is usurious.' 64
Variation by Agreement. Article 5069-1.03 provides for a maximum al-
lowable statutory rate of interest of six percent per year, although this rate
may be varied by agreement. 65 During the past year three decisions con-
sidered the proof necessary to establish an agreement to pay interest at a
rate higher than six percent. In Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contrac-
tors & Supply, Inc. 166 the Texas Supreme Court ruled that if a letter agree-
ment to share the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, and maintaining
an oil and gas well did not specify a rate of interest to be charged, the
highest lawful rate allowed on the transaction is the statutory rate of six
percent. 167 In Triton the well operator unilaterally assessed ten percent
charges on the amounts owed by Marine for the costs of production and
deducted this amount from Marine's share of well proceeds. The court
disagreed with the operator's argument that Marine's silence on receipt of
160. 641 S.W.2d at 415.
161. Id at 416.
162. Id. at 418.
163. Id.
164. Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Austin
1983, no writ); Motor 9, Inc. v. World Tire Corp., 651 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
165. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
166. 644 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. 1982).
167. Id at 445. Because the letter agreement did not provide for interest and the defend-
ant actually charged a 10% rate of interest, the court ruled that the plaintiff made out a
prima facie case of usury. Upon the plaintiff's prima facie showing of usury, the defendant
therefore had the burden of introducing sufficient evidence of an agreement to pay a higher
rate. Id. at 445.
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joint interest billings showing the interest charges evidenced Marine's ac-
quiescence or agreement to pay the higher rate of interest, or that the oper-
ator's unilateral deduction of the charges from Marine's share of proceeds
was tantamount to payment by Marine. 68 The court distinguished the
case of Preston Farm & Ranch Supply v. Bio-Zyme Enterprises,'69 which
held that continued payments and purchases made after receipt of interest-
charging invoices constituted evidence of an agreement between the par-
ties to pay interest. The court noted that in Bio-Zyme the mere failure to
object within a reasonable time to the interest charges, without more, could
not establish an agreement between the parties. 170 The court noted that
although Marine never complained of the interest charges, it also never
paid them, and the operator's unilateral act in deducting the interest
charges from Marine's share of proceeds was not evidence of an agreement
between the parties to pay more than the statutory rate.' 71
InAmarillo Equity Investors, Inc. v. Craycroft Lacy Partners172 the Fort
Worth court of appeals held that when the borrower shows that the parties
agreed to the charging of interest on account balances, but did not agree to
a specific rate, the burden is on the lender to show the existence of an
agreement to pay interest above the statutory rate. 73 The lendor intro-
duced testimony showing that the borrower actually made a substantial
payment on the account balance after the interest charges appeared on the
statements. The court held that mere payment of part of the amount due
on the accounts was not evidence of accepting interest charges at a higher
rate.' 74 Although the borrower never complained of the interest charges,
no evidence was introduced to show that the borrower made payments in a
manner that would indicate agreement to the higher rate.
The Amarillo court of appeals reached a different result in Motor 9, Inc.
v. World Tire Corp. 175 In Motor 9 the court held that although the parties
never executed an express agreement tor the payment of interest in excess
of the statutory rate, the buyer's conduct in continuing to order and receive
goods from seller for several months after the first interest charges were
imposed was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the buyer agreed
to pay interest in excess of the statutory rate. 176
Procedure-Standing. During the past year, three Texas decisions ad-
dressed the issue of who may bring a claim for usury. In RepublicBank
Dallas v. Shook 177 the Texas Supreme Court held that an individual guar-
antor of corporate notes cannot claim usury, even though the guaranteed
168. Id
169. 625 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1981).
170. 644 S.W.2d at 445.
171. Id. at 446.
172. 654 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
173. Id at 30.
174. Id at 31.
175. 651 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. Id. at 302.
177. 653 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1983).
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loan provided for interest at a rate in excess of the maximum statutory rate
for individuals. In RepublicBank the lender required an individual to in-
corporate his business in order to charge interest to the business at the
higher rates allowed for corporations. The court held that a lender's re-
quirement that an individual incorporate so that the lender could loan
funds to the individual at a higher rate of interest was not a violation of the
usury laws, but demonstrated an intent to comply with the laws, and that
the corporate entity will therefore be disregarded only when fraud or other
illegality is involved. 78 The court further noted that the trend in Texas
cases is in harmony with the majority of states and the New York Rule.
The New York Rule provides that an individual guarantor of a corporate
obligation may not assert a usury defense for a loan that charges interest at
a rate permissible for corporations but exceeding the permissible rate for
individuals, unless the loan is made to the guarantor to discharge his per-
sonal obligations and is not in furtherance of a corporate or general busi-
ness enterprise. 179 If an individual borrows through a shell corporation to
further his own business or commercial enterprises, the defense of usury is
not available. Shell corporations may be used to avoid the usury laws pro-
vided that the true borrower has a business purpose and the corporation
itself is a financing device used in furtherance of the profit-oriented enter-
prise. The court also noted that pursuant to the 1981 amendment to article
5069-1.04, the lender must determine the purposes of the loan and distin-
guish between business, commercial, investment, or other purposes and
personal, family, household, or agricultural use.' 80
Similarly, the El Paso court of appeals in Stanley v. Connor Construction
Co. '81 held that the president of a construction company, who was
comaker on a note with his corporation, lacked standing to sue for usury
when the corporation was the true borrower and the president signed as an
accommodation party, although the rate charged exceeded the lawful max-
imum for individuals.'8 2 The court noted that although article 1302-2.09
does not explicitly state that accommodation makers cannot assert a claim
or defense of usury, guarantors and accommodation makers stand on the
same footing with respect to the claim or defense of usury. 8 3
In Orr v. International Bank of Commerce184 the court of appeals ap-
plied the rule that the usury defense does not survive the death of either
the debtor or the creditor. In Orr the executrix of the deceased plaintiffs
estate appealed from a judgment denying her claim of usury on a promis-
sory note executed by the decedent to the defendant bank. The reviewing
court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment, and
178. Id at 281.
179. Id
180. Id at 281-82; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1971-1983).
181. 651 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1983, no writ).
182. Id. at 38.
183. Id at 39; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1980).
184. 649 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
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that the absence of jurisdiction was fundamental error subject to review for
the first time on appeal. 85 The court's lack of jurisdiction was neither a
question of want of subject matter jurisdiction nor of jurisdiction over the
parties, but resulted because the underlying cause of action was not one
that survives the death of a party.
Procedure-Defenses. Article 5069-1.06 provides that when usurious in-
terest is charged by a lender through accidental and bona fide error, no
penalty is imposed. 186 During the past year three cases addressed the issue
of what constitutes excusable error. In Tyra v. Bob Carroll Construction
Co. 187 the Texas Supreme Court considered the case of a creditor who
sued to collect on an open account and whose attorney included a prayer
for usurious interest in its petition. The attorney used a pleading form as a
guide in preparing the petition for the case. Although the creditor never
sent a demand for interest to the debtor and never instructed the attorney
to add a demand for interest, the attorney inadvertently failed to remove
the paragraph from the form pleading. The supreme court affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals 88 and held that the attorney's demand for
interest was bona fide error, and that no penalty would be imposed against
the appellant. 89
The Austin court of appeals held in Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communica-
tions, Inc. 190 that if a creditor's agent charged a rate of interest on custom-
ers' past due accounts in excess of the statutory maximum, the fact that the
agent was ignorant of the usury laws and that the agent's actions violated
the creditor's practice and policy did not make the charging of usurious
interest an excusable mistake if the agent intended to charge the rate as-
sessed.19' The court held that a creditor's intent to charge usurious interest
is immaterial if, in fact, the lender contracted for, charged, or received
interest on a loan in excess of the maximum amount permitted by law. 192
Furthermore, the court held that including the additional element of intent
as part of the statutory cause of action, outside the areas of contractual
provisions for interest and accidental and bona fide error, would circum-
vent the statute's regulatory purposes and the legislature's intent. 93 In Es-
parza the court found that although the creditor's agent acted unilaterally
and in violation of company practice and policy, he intentionally prepared
and mailed the items demanding usurious interest, even though he may
have been unaware of the usury laws. 194 Similarly, in Goldring v. Texas
185. Id at 772.
186. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
187. 639 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1982).
188. 618 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981), af'd, 639 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1982).
189. 639 S.W.2d at 690.
190. 653 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
191. Id. at 536.
192. Id. at 535 (citing Cochran v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 586 S.W.2d 849, 850
(Tex. 1979)).
193. 653 S.W.2d at 535.
194. Id. at 536.
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Commerce Bank-Arlington 195 the Fort Worth court of appeals ruled that a
lack of intent by a bank to charge a usurious rate of interest was no defense
to a claim of usury if the bank intended to make the charges assessed and
those charges exceeded the statutory maximum. 96
Generally, a lender may not raise the defense of estoppel against a bor-
rower's charge of usury. In Miro v. Allied Finance Co. ,197 however, the
Houston court of appeals held that a corporation was entitled to that de-
fense if the corporation made a usurious loan to its own legal counsel, who
prepared the loan agreements in question. The court held that in this in-
stance the borrower had a fiduciary duty to bring any usury problems to
the attention of the corporation.198 The court further ruled that the coun-
sel's deception of the corporation and his breach of fiduciary duty es-
topped him from raising the defense of usury and recovering damages
therefor. 199
Procedure-Appeals. Texas courts generally hold that usury cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. In Pinnacle Homes, Inc. v. RCL Off-
shore Engineering Co. 200 the court of appeals ruled that the debtors waived
the usury defense by not filing a request for additional or amended find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law where the debtors raised the affirmative
defense of usury at trial, but the trial court failed to address the issue of
whether or not the subject transaction was usurious. The court held that in
order to properly preserve the point for appellate review the debtors must
request a specific finding that the transaction was usurious and, if the trial
court fails to issue such specific finding, the debtors must perfect a bill of
exception showing the court's failure or refusal to comply. 20 1
In Tri County Farmer's Co-op v. Bendele202 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a creditor who failed to make a threshold pleading of its defenses
to a charge of usury, including the defense of accidental and bona fide
error, was barred from subsequently asserting those defenses on appeal.
The court held this to be true even though the trial court only assessed a
penalty of double the rate of interest plus attorneys' feez under article
5069-1.06(1) and upon review the court of appeals assessed a penalty of
two times the interest, attorneys' fees, and cancellation of principal under
article 5069-1.06(2).203 The supreme court noted that the fact that article
5069-1.06 contains varying degrees of penalties does not create separate
causes of actions for which independent defenses may be raised. The court
195. 651 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 203 (Feb.
8, 1984).
196. Id. at 363-64.
197. 650 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); seesupra notes 82-
86 and accompanying text.
198. 650 S.W.2d at 944.
199. Id.
200. 640 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
201. Id at 631.
202. 641 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1982).
203. Id. at 210.
1984]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
also affirmed the holding of the court of appeals that the doctrine of de
minimis non curat lex is not applicable to excuse a creditor from the in-
creased penalties of article 5069-1.06(2) when the interest charged only
slightly exceeded twice the lawful rate.2°4
In Biggs v. Garrett20 5 the El Paso court of appeals reversed a trial court
decision that found that a contractor mistakenly charged a homeowner in-
terest on retail materials during a statutory interest-free period, and as-
sessed the maximum statutory penalty. 2°6 The court further held that
because the record contained no evidence to support the trial court's find-
ing of accident, honest error, or honest mistake in charging interest on the
retail materials during the statutory interest-free period, the trial court's
decision must be reversed due to insufficient evidence and could not be
supplemented on appeal.20 7
Finally, in Orr v. International Bank of Commerce20 8 the San Antonio
court of appeals noted that lack of jurisdiction in the trial court was a
fundamental error and could be raised for the first time on appeal. 2°9
IV. EXEMPT PROPERTY
A. Constitutional Amendment
In late 1983 the Sixty-Eighth Texas Legislature proposed and the electo-
rate adopted a constitutional amendment changing the constitutionally
protected urban homestead from one based on lot value to one based on
size. 210 Prior to the new amendment, homeowners were entitled to exempt
204. Id
205. 651 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
206. Id. at 345.
207. Id at 344.
208. 649 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); see supra notes 184-85 and
accompanying text.
209. 649 S.W.2d at 771.
210. The new amendment was approved on Nov. 8, 1983, and became law on Nov. 30,
1983. The text of the amendment provides:
The homestead, not in a town or city, shall consist of not more than two hun-
dred acres of land, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improve-
ments thereon; the homestead in a city, town or village, shall consist of lot or
lots amounting to not more than one acre of land, together with any improve-
ments on the land; provided, that the same shall be used for the purposes of a
home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the homestead claim-
ant, whether a single adult person, or the head of a family; provided also, that
any temporary renting of the homestead shall not change the character of the
same, when no other homestead has been acquired.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51. Concurrently, the legislature amended article 3833(a) of the
Revised Statutes to provide:
(a) If it is used for the purpose of a home, or as a place to exercise the
calling or business to provide for a family or a single, adult person, not a
constituent of a family, the homestead of a family or a single, adult person,
not a constituent of a family, shall consist of:
(1) for a family, not more than two hundred acres, which may be in one or
more parcels, with the improvements thereon, if not in a city, town, or village;
or (2) for a single, adult person, not a constituent of a family, not more than
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up to $5000 in lot value together with improvements thereon as their urban
homestead if the lot was acquired prior to 1971, and up to $10,000 in lot
value together with any improvements if the lot was acquired after 1971.211
Texas residents now may exempt from forced sale by creditors up to one
acre in lot size as their urban homestead together with all improvements
thereon regardless of when the homestead was acquired. The purpose be-
hind the constitutional amendment apparently was to provide increased
protection for the homesteads of urban dwellers. Due to the effects of in-
flation, many lots in urban areas are now worth substantially more than
$10,000, which caused families to risk losing their homes in excess value
sales by foreclosing creditors.212 Other reasons for the constitutional
amendment were that the change would harmonize the urban homestead
provisions with the provisions for rural homesteads, which have always
been defined in terms of acreage, 213 and would make unnecessary periodic
amendment of the state constitution to reflect changes in the price of land
or standard of living.214
The constitutional amendment applies retroactively to all existing urban
homesteads irrespective of when they were first acquired. The disparate
treatment of homesteads acquired prior to and after 1971 is therefore re-
moved. The constitutional amendment also renders moot for precedential
purposes much of the existing literature and case law on creditors' rights to
foreclose on the excess lot value of urban homestead property.
Certain potential problems are readily apparent with regard to the new
homestead amendment. First, the new amendment is arguably too gener-
ous because it fails to limit the value of improvements that may be placed
on the acre of residential land eligible for exemption. Second, because the
urban homestead exemption applies to both residential and business prop-
erty, under the new constitutional provisions a family-owned business in
an urban environment may exempt an acre of commercial real estate with-
out regard to value or improvements thereon. Third, the new homestead
exemption could unnecessarily and unreasonably inhibit the financing al-
ternatives of families and businesses who may desire to pledge their urban
property as security for a debt. Finally, the new constitutional provision
affects residents whose current lots exceed one acre in size. Many of these
lots, which were acquired at a time of lower land values, may have been
protected from creditors by the old homestead provisions but are now pro-
one hundred acres, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improve-
ments thereon, if not in a city, town, or village; or
(3) for a family or a single, adult person, not a constituent of a family, a
lot or lots amounting to not more than one acre of land, together with any
improvements thereon, if in a city, town, or village.
Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 976, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309 (amending TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 3833(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now codified before amendment in TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
211. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1970, amended 1983).
212. Analysis of Proposed Constitutional Amendment as Appearing on November 8, 1983
Ballot in TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, INFORMATION REPORT 83-4, Aug. 1983, at 13.
213. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1970).
214. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Aupra note 212, at 13.
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tected only to the extent of one acre. This presents the possibility of an
unintended and inequitable result.
Under the new amendment one key issue for litigation will be the proper
criteria for distinguishing rural from urban property and for defining the
business homestead. Another key question is whether courts will allow
urban homesteaders owning more than one acre of property to arbitrarily
designate the boundary of their exempt property in order to render the
excess acreage either undesirable or valueless to the attaching creditor, or
whether the courts will permit urban residents to declare that their urban
homestead consists of more than one separate parcel of land, as is permit-
ted for the rural homestead exemption.215 Finally, because of the lack of
specific statutory guidance, courts will need to determine the procedures to
govern creditors' foreclosure actions on excess urban acreage, although the
foreclosure procedures for excess rural acreage may apply.216
B. Case Law
With the increasingly generous urban homestead exemption, Texas
courts may have to reconsider whether an urban debtor may convert for-
merly nonexempt property into homestead property on the eve of bank-
ruptcy, or whether such a transaction should be set aside as a fraud on
creditors. In In re Reed 217 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court
ruling that a debtor who converted substantially all his nonexempt prop-
erty into exempt homestead property on the eve of bankruptcy would be
entitled to the homestead exemption, but would not receive a discharge in
bankruptcy.218 The court noted that although the debtor's intent to de-
fraud his creditors does not limit the availability of the homestead exemp-
tion under the state law, the debtor's eligibility for discharge is determined
by federal law and could be denied because of his fraudulent acts. 219 The
court found that Reed liquidated substantial amounts of nonexempt prop-
erty and used the proceeds to reduce the mortgage on his homestead, while
fraudulently prevailing upon his creditors to forbear demanding payment
on their claims. Although debtors generally are permitted to convert non-
exempt property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy in order to
take full advantage of the bankruptcy exemptions, the court in Reed held
that if the conversion is fraudulently made, the court may deny the
debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. 220
The generous extent of homestead protection in Texas also was evi-
215. See Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 976, § I, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309 (amending TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3833(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now codified before amend-
ment in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Pam. 1983)) (200-acre rural homestead
exemption remains unchanged from prior law).
216. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.021-.030, 42.003 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly
codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 3841-3859 (Vernon 1966)).
217. 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
218. Id. at 988.
219. Id. at 991.
220. Id. at 992.
[Vol. 38
CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
denced in Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt,22' in which the Houston court of ap-
peals held that an employer's loan of money to an employee, secured by a
deed of trust on the employee's former home, did not create a purchase
money lien on the employee's new home merely because the loan proceeds
were used to purchase the new home. 222 Under Texas law, the only per-
missible liens attaching to a homestead are those for purchase money,
taxes, home improvements, and those ordered by decree of a court.223 In
Lffemark the employer argued that the employee who used the borrowed
funds to acquire a new home held the home in resulting trust for the em-
ployer. The court noted that "'No resulting trust exists in favor of one
who pays the purchase money by way of mere loan to another; the convey-
ance being taken in the name of a borrower.' "224 To create a resulting
trust "'[t]here must be an actual payment from a man's own money, or
what is equivalent to payment from his own money .... ' 225
Further demonstrating the court's solicitous approach to homestead ex-
emptions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Texas held in In re Harlan 226 that a chapter 7 debtor who filed for bank-
ruptcy within six months after selling his homestead would be entitled to
exempt all of the sales proceeds from his creditors regardless of the use the
debtor eventually made of the money.227 The court reasoned that the
rights of all parties are fixed on the date of filing a petition in bankruptcy,
and that because Texas statutes protect the proceeds from the sale of a
homestead from creditors for six months following such sale, 228 any debtor
who files a petition in bankruptcy within the six-month period may perma-
nently exempt the proceeds from the claims of prepetition creditors. 229
Finally, in In re Evans230 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that a noncustodial father who contributed
to the support of his children was head of a family within the broad mean-
ing of the personal property exemption statutes and therefore was able to
claim a $30,000 instead of a $15,000 personal property exemption.23' The
court also determined that partially encumbered furnishings were only
partially exempt, and that creditors could foreclose on the debtor's per-
221. 655 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
222. Id. at 313-14.
223. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3839 (Vernon 1966)). An example of lien attaching to a home-
stead through judicial decree would be a community property settlement pursuant to a
divorce.
224. 655 S.W.2d at 317 (quoting Jordan v. Jordan, 154 S.W. 359, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1913, writ refd)).
225. 655 S.W.2d at 317 (quoting Aaron Frank Clothing Co. v. Deegan, 204 S.W. 471, 471
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ refd)).
226. 32 Bankr. 91 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983).
227. Id. at 93.
228. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3834 (Vernon 1966) (current version at TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
229. 32 Bankr. at 93.
230. 25 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
231. Id. at 107-08;see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
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sonal property to the extent of their encumbrances. 232
V. CREDITORS' RIGHTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
During the past year, six Texas cases were reported respecting creditors'
rights under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Two of these decisions
reflect the strong policy of the Bankruptcy Code toward assuring equality
of distribution among creditors, and four cases indicate the strong influ-
ence of state law in determining creditors' claims against bankrupt debtors.
A. Preferences
In Yellow House Machinery Co. v. Mack 233 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
holding of a bankruptcy court that a debtor in possession may recover an
eve-of-bankruptcy payment to a creditor as a voidable preference despite
the fact that the debtor caused the creditor's position to be undersecured at
the time of payment by selling collateral and using the proceeds to operate
its business. The creditor attempted to defend the preference action by
arguing on general equitable principles that the court should deny recov-
ery to the debtor because the debtor's own misdeed caused the creditor to
lose its secured position. The court, however, distinguished between a
debtor and a debtor in possession and held that, notwithstanding the
debtor's misconduct, the preferential payment may be avoided by the
debtor in possession because the benefit would not accrue to the debtor,
but to its creditors.234 The court noted that because of the underlying pol-
icy of equality of distribution among creditors, 235 the debtor in possession
has the powers of a trustee and can sue under section 547 to set aside a
preferential transfer, even though nonbankruptcy cases would prevent any
successful recovery from the creditor. 236
In Abramson v. St. Regis Paper Co. 237 the Fifth Circuit held that a
trustee may recover the prepetition transfer of an option to purchase cer-
tain equipment as a preference even though the bankrupt was financially
incapable of exercising the option.238 In Abramson the bankrupt assigned
its option to purchase certain equipment to a general creditor in exchange
for the forgiveness of an antecedent debt and, in turn, received certain
additional consideration from a third party who ultimately purchased the
equipment at an increased price from the general creditor. The creditor
attempted to defend against the trustee's preference action by claiming
that the court could not find a preferential transfer without also finding a
diminution of the bankrupt's estate, and that because the bankrupt would
have been unable to exercise the option, no diminution of the estate oc-
232. 25 Bankr. at I10-11.
233. 704 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1983).
234. Id. at 821.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982).
236. 704 F.2d at 822; see II U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
237. 715 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1983).
238. Id. at 940.
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curred, and therefore no preference existed. The Fifth Circuit found the
diminution requirement to be implicit in the statute and equally implicit in
the decision of the trial court.239 The court required the creditor to return
the difference between the option price and the resale price of the equip-
ment and noted that the trustee's burden of proof did not require the
trustee to construct a hypothetical alternative transaction or to prove that
such a transaction would have been approved by all the parties con-
cerned.240 The court considered the bankrupt's earlier fruitless efforts to
transfer or use the option to be inconclusive regarding the value of the
option to the bankrupt and therefore reasoned that when the consideration
paid to the bankrupt by the third party is neither enforceable by the bank-
rupt nor essential to the transaction, the creditor may not claim the giving
of new consideration as a defense to the preference action.24'
B. State Law Remedies
In L & N Consultants, Inc. v. Sikes242 the Dallas court of appeals was
called upon to decide the priority of claims between a deed of trust
lienholder and a mechanics' and materialmen's (M&M) lienholder on re-
movable improvements on premises held by a defaulting real estate devel-
oper. The trial court held in favor of the M&M lienholder, and the deed of
trust lienholder appealed on the grounds that the M&M lien attached only
to removable improvements and that at the time of dispute the M&M
lienholder's claim against the developer was for $19,728.57 in removables
and $18,489.52 in nonremovables. The deed of trust lienholder argued
that the trial court erred in permitting the M&M lienholder to satisfy the
unpaid amount for nonremovables from removable property. The M&M
lienholder argued that his lien extended to all removable improvements,
regardless of previous payment, and that article 5459, section 1 allows a
M&M lien claimant to recover the entire amount of its debt to the extent of
the total value of removable improvements. 243 The court noted that this
issue had been raised before the Texas Supreme Court in First National
Bank v. Whirlpool Corp. ,2,4 although the supreme court disposed of the
case without addressing the merits of that issue. Extrapolating from the
supreme court decision in Whirlpool, however, the court noted the impor-
tance of liberally construing the mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes
in such a way as to protect laborers and materialmen. 245 The court did not
go so far as to say that an M&M lienholder was not required to identify
and segregate the materials that he actually furnished, but noted that in
this case all of the removable materials were furnished by the M&M
239. Id at 937.
240. Id at 938.
241. Id at 940.
242. 648 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
243. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current
version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.123 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
244. 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974).
245. 648 S.W.2d at 372.
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lienholder as general contractor. The court concluded that the receipt of
prior payment for most of the removables did not effect the M&M
lienholder's right to recover his claim for nonremovable improvements
from the removable property.246
In Meyers v. Moody247 the Fifth Circuit held that under Texas law a
director-majority shareholder of an insolvent insurance company who con-
cealed material facts from the disinterested shareholders was individually
liable to creditors for damages based on the breach of his fiduciary duty.
In this case the director-majority shareholder was found to have been
grossly negligent and to have breached his fiduciary duties by undertaking
a massive acquisition program based on an artificially inflated surplus.
The court held that punitive damages, which are not recoverable in a rule
lOb-5 action, may be recovered under pendent state law claims.248 The
court noted that Texas courts historically permitted third party creditors to
recover damages directly from corporate directors who fraudulently or
even negligently misrepresent the financial conditionof the company.
249
Third party creditors, to recover, must rely in part on false financial state-
ments appearing in the annual report of a corporation by the director's
authorization, and under Texas common law directors may be held liable
for any loss resulting from negligent mismanagement of a corporation.
250
This decision raises new possibilities for recovery in bankruptcy court by
trustees, creditors, and investors in failed Texas corporations who may
seek to recover the corporation's losses against directors individually if the
directors authorized financial statements that materially misstated the
financial condition of the corporation.
In Fan-Reed v. Upper Neches River Municipal Water Authority25 ' the
Tyler court of appeals held that the state's action against a privately owned
public sewage treatment facility to enjoin violation of state environmental
protection laws fell within an exemption to the automatic stay provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy stay did not prevent the state
from closing down the plant, despite the fact that a trustee was operating
the water treatment system subject to the control of the bankruptcy court.
The court noted that under section 362(b)(4) and (5)252 the filing of a peti-
tion under sections 301, 302, or 303253 does not stay an action or proceed-
ing by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power or the
enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in a
proceeding to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory
246. Id at 371.
247. 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (petition for cert. filed).
248. Id at 1220.
249. Id. at 1213; see, e.g., Cameron v. First Nat'l Bank, 194 S.W. 469, 476 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Galveston 1917, writ refd) (director held liable for misrepresentations in corporate
financial statements used to obtain loan).
250. 693 F.2d at 1215.
251. 651 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
252. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982).
253. Id §§ 301-303.
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power.254 Insofar as use of the state's police and regulatory powers is con-
cerned, therefore, the filing of a bankruptcy petition and the appointment
of a trustee or debtor in possession does not preempt state law from safe-
guarding the quality of its environment or the rights of its citizens.
Finally, in Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association255 the
Fifth Circuit held that when a debt secured by a valid lien on a debtor's
homestead is in default and is accelerated before the debtor files for relief
under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is not permitted to
cure his default under section 1322(b)(5), and the creditor is entitled to
relief from the automatic stay to pursue its foreclosure action in state
court.
2 56
VI. ESTABLISHING AND COLLECTING CLAIMS
A. Summary Judgment
In reviewing the long line of Texas cases limiting a plaintiffs right to
summary judgment when suing on a promissory note,257 the court of ap-
peals in Bevan v. Zarges258 held that as a matter of law an owner of a lost
promissory note is not entitled to summary judgment. 259 The court fol-
lowed its previous holding in Haupt v. Coldwell,260 in which it reversed a
trial court decision that granted summary judgment even though the in-
strument in question was lost.261 The decision of the court of appeals in
Bevan was reversed on appeal by the Texas Supreme Court on the ground
that although a lost note can create a fact issue, the plaintiffs careful draft-
ing of the supporting affidavits can support the motion for summary judg-
ment.262 Similarly, in Jackson T Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty
Co. 263 the plaintiff specifically recited its possession of the note, thus rais-
254. 651 S.W.2d at 360.
255. 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 478 (5th Cir. 1983).
256. Id. at 483-85; see 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1982).
257. See Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Dal Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1978); Texas Nat'l Corp. v.
United Syss. Int'l, Inc., 493 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1973); Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
462 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1970).
258. 645 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982), rev'd, 652 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1983).
259. 645 S.W.2d at 591.
260. 500 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ).
261. Id. at 565.
262. 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. 1983). The El Paso court of appeals exploined its ration-
ale in the Haupt case by stating:
It might be added that a person claiming to be the owner of a lost instru-
ment is not a "holder" since he is not in possession of the paper. He has no
right as a holder . . . . Because of this and the requirement that the sum-
mary judgment proof establish that a plaintiff be the owner and holder of the
note, we doubt that this case can ever be disposed of by summary judgment.
The Uniform Commercial Code does provide for recovery to the owner of a
note who might be in the Plaintiff's position, but there the trial Court may
require security indemnifying the defendant against loss by reason of further
claims on the instrument.
500 S.W.2d at 565. The supreme court in Bevan did not disagree with this analysis but
merely concluded that these problems were not a factor here. 652 S.W.2d at 369.
263. 649 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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ing the presumption of his being a holder in due course. 264 The defense of
failure of consideration, although good against the original payee and
holder, did not preclude the entry of summary judgment because the
plaintiff's status as a holder in due course was not destroyed and the plain-
tiff's knowledge of the defenses, therefore, was not established. 265 Both
Bevan and Stewart Title illustrate the potential pitfalls for plaintiffs seek-
ing summary judgment in suits on promissory notes.
B. Garnishment
A creditor's counsel can turn to three cases decided during the survey
period for guidance when seeking to garnish debtors' funds. In Canyon
Lake Bank v. Townsend 266 the garnishor bank appealed the decision of the
trial court, which held the bank liable for wrongful garnishment. Canyon
Lake Bank filed its application for writ of garnishment after obtaining a
money judgment. Another bank, named as garnishee, refused to honor
checks submitted for payment by the judgment debtor, including one
check drawn against a trust checking account.267 On these facts the trial
court awarded a money judgment to Townsend for wrongful garnishment.
On appeal, Canyon Lake Bank argued that on the basis of the allegations
in its affidavit, which was filed with its application for writ of garnishment,
the garnishment was not wrongful.268 The court of appeals found that al-
though Canyon Lake Bank's affidavit did not recite, as required by statute,
that the judgment debtor to the bank's knowledge had no assets available
for attachment, the statutory requirement was for the benefit of the gar-
nishee and not the judgment debtor. 269 In this case the garnishee did not
object to the affidavit although it would have been within its rights to have
the writ quashed.270 Notwithstanding the judgment debtor's apparent lack
of standing to attack the affidavit, the court noted that even if the judgment
debtor had standing, in order to attack the affidavit for falsely stating
264. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 3.302 (Vernon 1968) defines a holder in due course
as a "holder who takes the instrument (1) for value; and (2) in good faith; and (3) without
notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person."
265. 649 S.W.2d at 131. Courts have long held that a note holder is presumed to be a
holder in due course. Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1982); Favors
v. Yaffe, 605 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Thus, defenses good against the original holder and payee are invalid against the holder in
due course unless the presumption is rebutted.
266. 649 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
267. Townsend's trust account was found to be comprised solely of funds belonging to
third parties. The trust account was utilized by Townsend in his profession as an attorney.
The jury found that Townsend's inability to use the account caused $20,000 in damages to
his reputation and $12,464.45 in damages for loss of future earnings. Id at 810.
268. The application for writ of garnishment must be supported by affidavit that the
judgment defendant, within the knowledge of the affiant, does not have property in his pos-
session within the state that is subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment. TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966).
269. 649 S.W.2d at 811.
270. Id. ;see Bowers v. Continental Ins. Co., 65 Tex. 51, 52 (1885); Gottesman v. Toubin,
353 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1962, no writ).
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nonawareness of property actually in existence, the judgment debtor must
plead and prove to the contrary, which he did not do in the instant case.271
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the judgment debtor's argument that
he was injured by the garnishee's freezing of the trust account. Despite the
undisputed damage to the judgment debtor, the act of the garnishee could
not be imputed to the garnishor. 272
The case of Black Coral Investments v. Bank of the Southwest2 73 further
defines the garnishor's burden in obtaining a writ. In Black Coral the
judgment debtor intervened in a garnishment action and, at the hearing on
its motion to quash, introduced evidence that it owned personal property
located in a warehouse within the state. The trial court ruled in the judg-
ment debtor's favor, finding that (1) the garnishor did not have a good
faith belief that the judgment debtor was without assets within the state
sufficient to satisfy the judgment; (2) the judgment debtor had sufficient
assets within the state to satisfy the judgment; and (3) the garnishor could
not show, as a matter of fact, that the judgment debtor did not have assets
sufficient to satisfy the judgment.274 On appeal, the court of appeals held
that the trial court misread article 4076 regarding the content of the
garnishor's affidavit as requiring too great a burden on the garnishor and
as requiring the garnishor to prove a negative.275
The most significant case regarding garnishments during the survey pe-
riod emanates from the Texas Supreme Court and should be heeded by all
garnishees whose debt arises pursuant to an unmatured promissory note.
In Williams v. Stansbury 276 Williams, a holder in due course, notified the
garnishee, an obligee under a promissory note to the obligor-judgment
debtor, that Williams had purchased and that payment was due to him. 277
271. 649 S.W.2d at 811; see Industrial State Bank v. Wylie, 493 S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ); King v. Tim, 352 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1961, no writ); Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Teas, 138 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1940), aI'd, 158 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1942); Griffin v. Cawthon, 77 S.W.2d 700,
702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934, writ refd).
272. 649 S.W.2d at 811.
273. 650 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
274. Id at 136.
275. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076, § 3 (Vernon 1966) states that writs of
garnishment may issue "[w]here the plaintiff has a valid subsisting judgment and makes
affidavit that the defendant has not, within his knowledge, property in his possession within
this State, subject to execution, sufficient to satisfy such judgment."
276. 649 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1983).
277. Generally, a 'judgment debtor may not circumvent the garnishee's debtor-creditor
relationship with the judgment debtor by assignment. Gause v. Cone, 73 Tex. 239, 241, 11
S.W. 162, 163 (1889); Intercontinental Terminals Co. v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 630 S.W.2d
861, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.). The supreme court in
Stansbury noted:
An exception to this rule arises when the underlying debt in the hands of the
garnishee has been suspended by the issuance of a negotiable instrument that
has not fully matured. The reasons for this exception are explained in I E.
Cook, Creditors' Rights in Texas § 3.37(a) (2d ed. 1981) at 133:
Such favored treatment is given to the holder in due course not simply
to protect good-faith purchase but also, and even more importantly, to
serve the greater need of certainty in commercial dealings. Granting
the right to cut off various defenses to a holder in due course gives the
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Some years passed after Williams's demand for payment, and Stansbury
settled with the garnishor but ignored Williams's claim to payment under
the note. The supreme court, noting Williams's status as a holder in due
course, concluded that despite Williams's knowledge of the garnishment
action, he was under no obligation to intervene in that action to preserve
his claim against Stansbury. The court concluded that it was Stansbury's
responsibility to bring all claimants to the note into the litigation in order
to protect himself.278 Stansbury's failure to do so unfortunately left him
open to double liability.
C. Attorneys' Fees
The decision by the Fifth Circuit in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Manges279
provides an excellent source for determining the standards for reasonable
attorneys' fees in state or federal courts. In the course of finding that At-
lantic Richfield was entitled to the fees pled because its fees were not, as
contended by Manges, incurred in asserting an excessive claim, the court
reviewed the state and federal standards for attorneys' fees. In response to
Manges's claim that Atlantic Richfield should be denied recovery of attor-
neys' fees for pursuing an excessive claim, the Fifth Circuit stated that a
party's claim is excessive if (1) the claim wrongfully demands an amount
in excess of what is due and (2) the creditor either refuses or clearly indi-
cates that he will refuse the amount actually due.280 The court found,
however, that the elements of an excessive claim were not present and that
although the trial court properly analyzed the issue of the propriety of at-
torneys' fees according to state law, the award of attorneys' fees was also
supported by the federal standards announced in Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc. 281 The court reaffirmed that in diversity cases state rules
regarding attorneys' fees apply.282
purchaser of commercial paper confidence that it will be enforceable
and, therefore, worth the amount that it purports to be worth.
649 S.W.2d at 296 n.2.
278. Id. at 296.
279. 702 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1983).
280. Id at 87; see Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Servs. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205, 212 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
281. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve-part test required by Johnson considers:
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case;
(5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the undesirability of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and
(12) awards in similar cases.
282. 702 F.2d at 87. The Texas courts consider:
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The recoverability of attorneys' fees in suits founded on oral or written
contracts was reviewed during the survey period in Pan American Bank v.
Nowland.283 The court of appeals interpreted the 1979 amendment to arti-
cle 2226, which now permits the recovery of attorneys' fees in a suit
founded on oral as well as written contracts. 284 Despite the fact that the
plaintiff's original petition was filed in 1977 and amended to include a
prayer for attorneys' fees in 1980 after the amendment to article 2226 took
effect, the court concluded that the intent of the legislature permitted the
plaintiff to recover his attorneys' fees.285 The court cited section 2 of the
amendatory act to article 2226 and concluded that all pending actions
would benefit from the provisions in article 2226.286
The recoverability of attorneys' fees for defending against counterclaims
such as usury, duress, and lack of good faith when pursuing a suit on a
promissory note was considered in RepublicBank Dallas v. Shook .287 The
court of appeals held that the value of the efforts of the bank's attorneys to
collect on the promissory note, absent a response to the defendant's claims
of usury, duress, and lack of good faith, was substantially less than the
amount of attorneys' fees prayed for and that defending against those de-
fenses was not contemplated by the contract.288 The supreme court dis-
agreed with the court of appeals, citing the case of Williamson v. Tucker 289
and noting that had the bank's attorneys not defended against the allega-
tions of the defendant, it probably would not have recovered on the
note.290
D. Foreclosures
Texas courts of appeals rendered two decisions during the survey period
(1) the nature of the case: its difficulties, complexities, importance, and the
nature of the services required to be rendered by counsel;
(2) the amount of money involved, the client's interest at stake, the amount
of time devoted by the attorney, and the benefit derived by the client; and
(3) the time necessarily spent by the attorney, the responsibility imposed
upon counsel, and the skill and experience reasonably needed to perform
the services.
Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Servs. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205, 212-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
283. 650 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
284. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
285. 650 S.W.2d at 883.
286. Id.
287. 653 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1983).
288. 627 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981).
289. 615 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.). The facts in
Williamson are less favorable to the party seeking to recover attorneys' fees. In Williamson
the plaintiff sought recovery on the note in state court and had to defend an action by the
debtor to rescind the obligation evidenced by the note in federal court. Yet, the court of
appeals found that if the creditor had not defended the action in federal court, it would not
have recovered on the note. Id at 892.
290. 653 S.W.2d at 282. For other reported decisions concerning collection of attorneys'
fees when suing on a promissory note, see Buffalo Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Trumix Concrete
Co., 641 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Boulevare v. Security State
Bank, 640 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
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dealing with a creditor's right to foreclose without notice of acceleration
pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust, but the decisions reached oppo-
site results. In Bodiford v. Parker291 the Fort Worth court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's decision to equitably restrict and enjoin the
enforcement of a deed of trust that purportedly allowed the trustee to fore-
close without providing the debtor with notice of acceleration. The deed
of trust contained language that permitted the trustee to foreclose without
sending the debtor notice of acceleration and demand for payment of past
due installments. 292 After receiving notice of foreclosure without prior no-
tice of intent to accelerate, the debtor obtained an injunction preventing
foreclosure. The court of appeals reviewed the decision of Ogden v. Gibral-
tar Savings Association 293 and determined that notice, in the absence of
waiver of such notice, is a prerequisite to foreclosure. 294 Although such a
waiver could arguably have been found in the deed of trust, the promis-
sory note contained no such waiver language, and the court concluded that
the exception to notice allowed by Odgen was not present here. 295
A contrary result was reached in Chapa v. Herbster296 although the facts
were similar to those contained in Bodiford. In Chapa the debtor at-
291. 651 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
292. The deed of trust contained the following language:
But should Grantors make default in the punctual payment of said indebted-
ness or any part thereof, principal or interest, as the same shall become due
and payable, . . . then ... the entire indebtedness hereby secured ... may,
at the option of the Beneficiary,. . . be immediately matured and become due
and payable without demand or notice of any character, and it shall there-
upon, or at any time thereafter, be the duty of the Trustee ... to enforce this
Trust and make sale of said real property as provided in Article 3810...
after notice as provided in said article (but without any other notice than is
required by said Article 3810, as amended) ....
Id. at 339.
293. 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982).
294. 651 S.W.2d at 339. The court in Bodford summarized the general rule regarding
notices set forth in Ogden:
1. Notice of intent to accelerate is necessary in order to provide the debtor an
opportunity to cure his default prior to the harsh consequences of acceler-
ation and foreclosure.
2. Proper notice that the debt has been accelerated, in the absence of a con-
trary agreement or waiver, cuts off the debtor's right to cure his default
and gives notice that the entire debt is due and payable.
1d at 339 (quoting Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 234).
295. Id A vigorous dissent was lodged by two of the justices on the court. The dissent
cited the waiver language in the deed of trust as sufficiently clear to enable the trustee to
have met the standard contained in Ogden. 651 S.W.2d at 340 (Jordan, J., dissenting). The
Ogden standard requires notice of intent to accelerate "in the absence of a contrary agree-
ment or waiver." Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 234. Further, the dissent rejected the apparent con-
clusion of the majority that a waiver, to be enforceable, must be contained both in the
promissory note and the deed of trust. Justice Jordan, speaking for the dissent, stated, "I
believe that proposition is untenable for the reason that where a note and deed of trust are
executed contemporaneously as security instruments in the course of a single transaction, as
in this case, they are to be considered as though they are in fact a single instrument." 651
S.W.2d at 341 (citing Bennett v. State Nat'l Bank, 623 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); B & B Pharmacy & Drug, Inc. v. Lake Air Nat'l Bank, 449
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, writ dism'd)).
296. 653 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
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tempted to set aside a foreclosure on the grounds that the trustee did not
provide notice of demand, presentment, and acceleration of maturity.
Both the promissory note and the deed of trust contained express provi-
sions as to waiver of notice of demand and acceleration. 297 The court of
appeals affirmed that trial court's judgment for the trustee and stated that
when "a waiver of notice exists such notice of acceleration is dispensed with
and all that is required is statutory compliance .... *298 The two cases
can be distinguished, although poorly, on the basis that unlike the note in
Chapa, the promissory note in Bodiford did not contain unequivocal
waiver language.
E. Suretyship
As usual, there was a dearth of suretyship cases reported during the sur-
vey period. One case of some note is City of San Antonio v. Argonaut In-
surance Co. 299 InArgonaut the trial court granted a summary judgment in
favor of the surety against the city of San Antonio, which attempted to
collect on a performance bond relating to alleged improper construction of
a waste water treatment plant. The trial court found that the performance
bond in question, although not specifically referring to a limitation period
for making a claim, incorporated as a matter of law article 5160, which
297. The promissory note contained the following language regarding waiver of notice:
This note shall become immediately due and payable at the option of the
Payee or other holder hereof, without presentment or demand or any notice to
the Maker or any other person obligated or to become obligated hereon, upon
default in the payment of any installment hereon when due, upon default under
the terms of any security instrument, or if any event occurs or condition exists
which authorizes the acceleration of maturity hereof under any agreement made
by the Maker.
The Maker, and all sureties, endorsers, and guarantors of this Note (i) waive
demand, presentment for payment, notice of nonpayment, protest, notice of
protest and all other notice, filing of suit and diligence in collecting this Note
or enforcing any of the security herefor.
Id. at 601 (emphasis added by court). The language in the deed of trust regarding waiver of
notice stated:
That in the event of default in the payment of any installment, principal or
interest, of the note hereby secured, in accordance with the terms hereof, or of
a breach of any of the covenants herein contained to be performed by Grantors,
then and in any of such events Beneficiary may elect, Grantors hereby expressly
waiving presentment and demand for payment, to declare the entire principal in-
debtedness hereby secured with all interest accrued theron and all other sums
hereby secured immediately due and payable, and in the event of default in the
payment of said indebtedness when due or declared due, it shall thereupon, or
at any time thereafter, be the duty of the Trustee, or his successor or substitute
as hereinafter provided, at the request of Beneficiary (which request is hereby
conclusively presumed), to enforce this trust; . . .and the recitals in the con vey-
ance to the Purchaser or Purchasers [at trustee's sale] shall befull and conclusive
evidence of the truth of the matters therein stated, and all prerequisites to said
sale shall be presumed to have been performed, and such sale and conveyance
shall be conclusive against Grantors, their heirs and assigns.
Id. (emphasis and brackets added by court).
298. Id. (emphasis in original).
299. 644 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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limits suits on performance bonds to one year after a certificate of accept-
ance is executed by the beneficiary. 3°° In this case, since the city of San
Antonio filed suit over three years after accepting the project, the court of
appeals held that summary judgment was proper.301
VII. BANKRUPTCY
The rules governing consumer and creditor rights are radically altered
whenever the veil of bankruptcy is invoked. The developments in and the
nuances of bankruptcy practice are beyond the scope of this Article, but
recent developments regarding jurisdiction merit mention.
The celebrated Braniff Airways bankruptcy led to a partial resolution of
the jurisdictional morass left in the wake of Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 302 Until the Fifth Circuit rendered its deci-
sion in In re Branff Airways, Inc. ,303 speculation abounded regarding the
operation and resolution of disputes before the bankruptcy court.3°4 The
administrative office of the United States courts drafted an emergency rule
300. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon 1971) provides:
A. Any person or persons, firm, or corporation ... entering into a formal
contract in excess of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) with this State, any de-
partment, board or agency thereof. . . or any other governmental or quasi-
governmental authority, whether specifically named herein or not, authorized
under any law of this State, general or local, to enter into contractual agree-
ments for the construction, alteration . . . or the prosecution or completion of
any public work, shall be required before commencing such work to execute to
the aforementioned governmental authority . . . the statutory bonds as here-
inafter prescribed ...
(a) A Performance Bond in the amount of the contract ....
(b) A Payment Bond, in the amount of the contract ....
G. All suits instituted under the provisions of this Act shall be brought in
a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the project or work, or
any part thereof, is situated. No suit shall be instituted on the performance
bond after the expiration of one (1) year after the date of final completion of
such contract.
As noted by the court:
"The terms of said Article 5160 are by law incorporated in and become part of
all bonds executed by a general contractor and furnished by him in connection
with the construction of public work or public buildings for the state, county,
school district or municipalities, whether or not such article is mentioned, re-
ferred to or incorporated in such bond."
644 S.W.2d at 91 (quoting United Title Co., Inc. v. Kermit Indep. School Dist., 273 S.W.2d
434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1954, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
301. 644 S.W.2d at 92.
302. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
303. 700 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'g 27 Bankr. 231 (N.D. Tex.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2122 (1983).
304. The operative provision of the jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, is 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) which provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdic-
tion on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title I I or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title I I is
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to continue the operation of the bankruptcy courts, due to the clear impli-
cation in Northern Pipeline that the bankruptcy courts were without juris-
diction except in certain limited circumstances. That rule, adopted by the
Fifth Circuit as well as other circuits, was intellectually indefensible ac-
cording to some commentators because the courts were legislating jurisdic-
tion in contravention of the United States Constitution. The per curiam
decision by the Fifth Circuit affirming the rationale and holding of the
district court in In re Braniff Airways, Inc., emphasized the operability of
the emergency rule. Consumers and creditors can now look to the bank-
ruptcy forum to resolve disputes and claims with the knowledge that final-
ity of decisions is at least possible.305
commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on
the district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or
a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a
particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable
by appeal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the
debtor, as of the commencement of such case.
305. See In re Basin Ref., Inc., 30 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983). Other courts
have had more trouble with the emergency rule. See In re Conley, 26 Bankr. 885 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Otero Mills, 10 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 899 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1983).
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